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  This study examines the sources of currency crises in ASEAN. The empirical 
findings indicate that reserve inadequacy, increase of bank’s claims on private sector, 
deteriorating trade balance and misalignment of real exchange rate increase the 
probability of a speculative attack on a currency. The results also suggest that the 
currency crises could be contagious. The significant variables are closely related to the 
external factors and thus, indicate the openess of the ASEAN-4 economy. Hence, we 
could conclude that there is a linkage between the economic fundamentals and currency 
crises in ASEAN.  
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  1  Four waves of financial crises have hit international capital markets during the 
1990s; the European Monetary System (ERM) crisis in 1992-1993, the collapse of 
Mexican peso with ‘tequilla effects’ in 1994-1995, the Asian flu of 1997-1998 and the 
Russia virus in 1998. These financial crises stimulated the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the economics of the crises in several ways, among other things on the 
determinants of a crisis (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999), its impact on domestic output 
(Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee, 2001) and policy implications (Rogoff, 1999).  
   The East Asian financial crises have been one of the most serious and challenging 
economic events of the 1990s. The macroeconomic conditions of these countries namely 
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines are shown in Tables 1. These newly 
emerging economies, which had succeeded in sustaining rapid growth through export 
promotion had strong economic fundamentals before the onset of the financial crisis, but 
also shared some disturbing similarities. 
[Table 1 here] 
  First, they all experienced slowdowns in economic growth in 1996 except the 
Philippines. Second, all four countries saw their current account deficits rose 
substantially due to sluggish growth in export earnings. As a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand saw their 
current account deficits deteriorate from 2.0%, 3.8%, 1.9%, and 5.7% percent in 1992 
respectively; to 3.4%, 4.9%, 4.7% and 4.7% in 1996 respectively. Third, the four 
countries accumulated large external debts. In 1996, Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Thailand had external debts amounting to US$102.2 billion, US$39.0 billion and 
US$78.5 billion respectively; which increased to US$137.1 billion, US$50.6 billion and 
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  2US$93.0 billion respectively, in 1997. Fourth, the real exchange rates in all four countries 
appreciated markedly. Finally, the levels of international reserves as a percentage of 
yearly imports were falling in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand from 1995 to 
1996. 
  The economists were divided as to which models are relevant to the East Asian 
currency crises as they are uncertain whether a currency crisis is due to fundamental 
imbalances or contagious events. Systematic empirical research on these issues is only 
just emerging and the evidence is mixed. Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) and 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) show that currency crises are frequently preceded by 
fundamental macroeconomic imbalances and early warning signs. On the other hand, 
Jeanne (1995) and Jeanne and Masson (1996) demonstrate empirically that French crisis 
of 1992-93 had strong self-fulfilling characteristics.  
This study examines the determinants of currency crises in ASEAN-4 countries: 
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. We develop a formal empirical model 
to analyse the determinants of currency crises. In addition, we would like to determine 
whether there exists contagion in foreign exchange markets, in which a speculative attack 
in one country may spread to the other countries. The currency crises of the 1997 have 
also raised questions about whether currency crises are predictable events with 
systematic early warning indicators or whether they are essentially unpredictable. This 
study will determine the ability of the model to predict the likelihood of currency crises 
in ASEAN-4 countries. 
  The paper is organised as follows. Section II summarises the literature on 
currency crises. Section III describes the definitions of crisis and contagion as well as the 
  3methodology used in the analysis and the justification for the selection of variables. 
Section IV presents the results and interpretations of the findings. Finally, Section V 
summarises the findings of the study.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
  Currency crisis theories go back to the Salant and Henderson (1978) model of 
speculative attack on the gold market, which Krugman (1979) applied to the foreign 
exchange market. In the model the government runs a budget deficit, which is financed 
through additional money creation. The private sector will exchange this additional 
money creation for foreign currency and so reserves are steadily lost until reserves reach 
the threshold level. At that time, the demand for money falls, reserves fall to zero and a 
currency crisis occurs. This speculative attack is driven by the natural outcome of 
investors’ maximization and forward-looking behaviour. 
  The first-generation models share the basic assumption of weak country 
fundamentals, which are known to be unsustainable in the context of a fixed exchange 
rate regime. This then establishes a unique relationship between fundamentals and timing 
of the crisis. The strength of the models is that a sudden speculative attack and loss of 
reserves occur even though all the behavioural functions are continuous and the 
fundamentals develop predictably. 
  The limitations of first generation theories became evident at latest after the EMS 
crisis in 1992-1993 since these models allowed only for an exchange rate peg, which 
either is or is not sustainable under the given fundamentals. The second-generation 
models take into account the possibility of self-fulfilling crises (Obstfeld, 1986, 1994, 
1996 or Jeanne, 1997). An increase in devaluation expectations makes it more costly for 
  4the authorities to maintain an exchange rate peg. These costs rise as higher interest rate 
lead to unemployment. The government weighs the costs of defending the exchange rate 
against the benefits. Investors anticipate the government’s calculation and can raise the 
costs of defence even further and the crisis become self-fulfilling. 
  These second generation models introduce the possibility of multiple equilibria: 
one in which there are no attacks, no change in fundamentals and indefinite maintenance 
of the peg and another in which investor expect an attack. The new fundamentals in the 
second equilibrium are validated after the investors’ expected change in the exchange 
rate actually occurs. The currency crisis is then modeled as a sudden jump from one 
equilibrium to another. And the timing of crisis is no longer uniquely determined. 
  There are several factors that can create a situation of multiple equilibria and may 
cause a self-fulfilling currency crisis. In Obstfeld (1994) market participants expect the 
currency to be devalued at a given rate and set nominal interest rate to a higher level. 
Because of high unemployment or a large debt burden, the higher interest rates make the 
peg too costly for the government to keep. Another source of multiple equilibria is the 
government’s expected desire to offset a negative output shock. Authorities’ behaviour as 
regards problems in the banking sector is another factor that can create a situation of 
multiple equilibria. As the central bank defends the peg, interest rate rise, which may 
cause losses to the banking sectors. 
  In emerging market countries willingness to decrease unemployment was not a 
key aspect of recent crises. Consequently, in a multiple equilibria model, Masson (1999) 
used a balance of payments approach to determine the country fundamentals. The cost 
benefits calculation is determined by expected value of foreign reserves and the model 
  5does not include a direct escape clause for the government. The source of multiple 
equilibria is the higher debt service costs for the government due to depreciation 
expectations. The model is tested with recent crises in emerging markets and finds that 
the fundamentals of some crisis countries were inside the multiple equilibria region.    
  The recent crises in emerging markets have also inspired new theories, where the 
liberalization of the financial system and the weaknesses in the banking sector are the 
reason for crises. Diaz-Alejandro (1985) cited the liberalization of financial markets and 
bad banking supervision as reasons for the banking and currency crises in Latin America. 
In addition, the public expects the government to intervene and save most depositors 
when financial intermediaries run into trouble, whether or not deposits are explicitly 
insured. The model by Calvo and Vegh (1993, 1999) points out that a non-credible 
stabilization programme can be a reason why a consumption boom is followed by a drop 
in output and finally a currency crisis. Similarly, Kamin and Wood (1997) pointed out the 
boom and bust cycle of capital flows after the liberalization as the reason for currency 
crises. 
  Some progress in explaining recent crises and contagion effect has been made 
using models that contain financial diversification and the use of leverage by investors. 
These models are founded on the basic portfolio theory, where a representative investor 
weighs the effects of different portfolio management rules and margin calls. They find 
that diversification, together with leveraged investors, creates condition for the contagion 
effect. In the model by Calvo (1998) the contagion effect is caused by margin calls by 
informed investors, who are then mimicked by uninformed investors. Calvo and 
Mendoza (2000) discuss optimal diversification as the number of possible investment 
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when the number of countries grows. This might cause herding behaviour and contagion 
of currency crises. 
  Herding behaviour can be one reason for the large capital flows and contagion 
effect. Studies have found many theoretical reasons for this herding behaviour 
(Schafstein-Stein 1990, Banerjee 1992, and Devenow-Welch 1996). Krugman (1997) 
gives two reasons for the herding behaviour in Asian crises. First, there is a bandwagon 
effect driven by investors’ awareness of expectations that other investors have private 
information. Secondly, much of the money invested in emerging markets is managed by 
agents rather than directly by principals. These agents are compensated in accord with 




  In this study, a currency crisis is defined following the definition by Frankel and 
Rose (1996), in which crisis is a nominal depreciation of at least 25% a year from the 
mean rate in the bilateral exchange rate vis-a-vis the U.S dollar. A currency crisis exists 
only when there is an abrupt change in the nominal exchange rate. The definition of crisis 
excluded the element of unsuccesful speculative attacks since it is very hard and 
subjective to define when a speculative attack has occurred then ascertain whether the 
countries, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, are under the condition of 
currency crises before proceeding to analyse the model of currency crises and contagion 
effects.    
  Following Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996), and Kruger, Osakwe and Page 
(1998), the model is written as 
  7 
( ) ( ) ε ϕ η t , i t , j 1 t , i t , j Crisis R L X Crisis + + = −                                     (1)  
            
where ϕ is the coefficient on the regional contagion variable R(Crisisj,t ); X(L)i, t-1  is a 
vector of information set of lagged explanatory variables of economic fundamentals from 
country i  in period t-1;  η is the vector of coefficients on the  lagged regressors and ε i, t  
is a normally distributed error term defined as, 
                ε i, t  =  αi  +   v i, t                                                                                                                (2) 
where αi is a random country specific effect and vi, t is normally distributed error term 
with zero mean and unit variance. The i subscript indexes the individuals countries of a 
cross-section and the t subscript indexes the time period in the available data. The 
variable  Crisis takes a value of 1 if crisis and 0 otherwise. The regional contagion 
variables, R (Crisisj,t ), for country j take a value of 1 if and only if, there is a crisis in at 
least one country other than j and if this condition is not satisfied the contagion variable 
will take a value of 0 for the period. 
  The lagged values of the economic fundamentals are used to indicate that crises 
arise due to persistent deteriorations in economic fundamentals. This implies that it takes 
some time for deterioration in economic fundamentals to trigger a currency crisis. 
Besides, we do not expect a very brief and short-lived decline in fundamentals to result in 
a currency crisis. Using lagged economic fundamentals enable us to segregate the effects 
of economic fundamentals on currency crises, which also provide a simple test of the 
ability of the explanatory variables to predict future crises.   
  
SOURCES OF DATA AND CHOICE OF VARIABLES 
  The data used in this empirical analysis were obtained from the International 
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the estimation is based on theoretical considerations and data availability, as suggested in 
previous studies, Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996), Sachs, Tornell and Velasco 
(1996) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). Using quarterly data for Malaysia, Thailand, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines spanning the ten-year period from 1987 to 1997, this paper 
hypothesizes that the macroeconomic variables: the ratio of M2 to reserve; the trade 
balance; the growth rate of domestic credit; the bank’s claims on the private sector; the 
domestic inflation; the real exchange rate and regional contagion, cause the currency 
crises.  
As in Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), the ratio of M2 to international reserves 
was chosen as a measure of reserve adequacy. This variable worked well in previous 
empirical studies and has been identified as a leading indicator of currency crises by 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). The use of a broad measure of money, as opposed to 
monetary base, in the definition of the reserve adequacy variable can be rationalised on 
the grounds that it measures the potential amount of liquid monetary assets that agents 
can try to convert into foreign exchange. To reduce dispersion in this variable and to 
facilitate the interpretation of its associated coefficient, the log form is used and it is 
expected that this variables to have a positive effect on the probability of crisis.  
The trade balance and the real exchange rate are indicators of external 
competitiveness. Along with the misalignment of the real exchange rate, trade imbalance 
could cause currency crisis. There is a fair amount of evidence showing that some 
currency crises are preceded by negative trade balance and volatile exchange rate. We 
expect the negative association of the trade balance while the real exchange rate to have a 
  9positive effect on the probability of crisis. The effects of monetary policies are captured 
by the growth rate of domestic credit and we expect to have a positive effect on currency 
crises.  
  The banks’ claims on the private sector are a measure of the health of the 
domestic banking system and are known as a lending boom variable. Sachs, Tornell and 
Velasco (1996), argue that lending booms increase the ratio of bad loans to total assets 
thereby weakening the banking system. A weak banking system increases the probability 
of speculative attack because the investors know that the government will be reluctant to 
resist an attack by increasing interest rates since this would result in bankruptcies and a 
recession. In this case, the crisis is self-fulfilling. This variable is expected to has a 
positive effect on the probability of crisis. 
  Contagion effects are the most recent contribution of extended second-generation 
models or a third-generation model. There are several channels through which they may 
be transmitted across countries. Most explanations, however, imply that contagion effects 
tend to occur at the regional level.  In order to capture the effects of contagion, we define 
a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 for countries where at least one other 
country has had one currency crisis in the quarter. We expect this variable to have a 
positive relationship on the probability of crisis. 
 
ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE 
  Using pooled quarterly data for Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines 
from 1987 to 1997, the study estimates explicitly the multiperiod probit model linking 
macroeconomic variables and a measure of contagion to the crisis index. Pooled quarterly 
data method is used to increase the number of observations and the number of crisis 
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for the Philippines. Furthermore, probit with random effects is an appropriate method to 
estimate a model that has dependent binary, repeated variables and repeated observations 
of the same group countries over time. 
 Let  Pi be the cumulative normal distribution, called Probit, for the i-th 
observations, then 
 
() ( ) ( )dz 2 / z exp 2 / 1 x F P
2 2 / 1 s
i i − ∫ = = ∞ − π β                               (3) 
 
where  β x s i =  
 
The Probit Model is written as 
 
    ()εi i
1
t P F y + =
−  
              ε β i i x + =                                                                               (4) 
 
where  () β x P F i i
1 =
−  is the inverse of cumulative distribution  ( ) β x F i . The probit model 




                                                                                 (5)  ε β i i
*
t x y + =
 
where  ~ i ε normal (0, 1). The value of binary   depends on the value if   is greater 




  Since the estimated coefficients in the probit model are difficult to interpret, the 
study reports the effects of one-unit changes in the regressors on the probability of crisis 
termed as marginal effects. The non-linear and the marginal contribution of each variable 
depends on the other explanatory variables in the models. In this study the marginal 
effect of   is calculated as  xi
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where  () () β δ β δ x / x F i i  is the density function associated with F (Greene, 1999). β i is 
weighted by a factor, in this case a density function, which depends on all the values of 
X.  As the density function is non-negative, therefore the direction of the effect of a 
change in β i depends on the sign of β i. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
  The regression results on the determinants of currency crises are reported in Table 
2.  Insignificant variables are subsequently excluded in each of the regression equations. 
The probit model with random effects is estimated utilizing a maximum likelihood 
procedure. There are no specific overall goodness-of-fit measures for this methodology. 
Therefore, the pseudo R
2 and likelihood test ratio were used for the test of overall 
goodness-of-fit and the percentage of right prediction to predict the likelihood of 
currency crises. 
  Model 1 uses all explanatory variables as derived from the model formulation. 
The coefficients that are significant at 1% level are the ratio of M2 to reserve, real 
exchange rate, bank’s claims on private sector, trade balance and regional contagion. 
These results support the findings by Kruger, Osakwe and Page (1998). But the growth 
rate of domestic credits and domestic inflation are insignificant at conventional levels. 
They all have the expected signs. The ratio of M2 to reserve has a positive coefficient 
and is significant at 1% level suggesting that countries with a low reserve relative to a 
broad measure of money are more likely to experience currency crises. The result is 
consistent with the view addressed in first-generation models of currency crises that 
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findings of Caramazza, Rici and Salgado (2000) that reserve inadequacy triggers a 
currency crisis.  The real exchange rate is significant at 1% level and has the expected 
sign indicating that misalignment of real exchange rate increases the probabilitiy of a 
currency crisis. 
  Domestic credit and domestic inflation are insignificant at conventional level. 
This is interesting given that these are important fundamental variables suggested in the 
theoretical literature. The result do not supports the notion that inconsistent in 
macroeconomic policies will lead to the countries having in a speculative situation 
suggesting that monetary expansion to finance the fiscal deficit do not increase the 
probability of currency crisis. On the other hand, trade balance variable is significant at 
1% level and has a negative influence on the probability of a currency crisis suggesting 
that a deteriorating trade balance is a risk factor.  
  The regional contagion variable has a positive sign and is significant at the 1% 
level, supporting the findings for industrial countries by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz 
(1996). A currency crisis in neighbouring country increases the probability of a 
speculative attack on the domestic currency. Two channels of international transmission 
of speculative attacks have been identified in the literature. The first channel is trade 
links in which a currency crisis in an economy forces the government to devalue the 
domestic currency and the second channel is information effects, hypothesising is that a 
currency crisis in one country sends a signal to speculators that pegs in countries with 
similar macroeconomic policies are unsustainable.   
Bank’s claims on private sector is significant at 1% level confirming the belief 
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in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines are due to the weaknesses in the 
banking sector supporting the hypothesis that lending booms in these countries weaken 
the structure of the banking sector and increase the probability of speculative attacks on 
the domestic currency. 
  In order to find a more parsimonious model, insignificant variables are excluded 
from our benchmark equation denoted as Models 2 and 3. Model 2 excludes the growth 
rate of domestic credit. The M2 to reserve, bank’s claims on private sector, trade balance, 
real exchange rate and regional contagion are all significant at conventional levels. The 
likelihood ratio test with one degree of freedom for exclusion of money growth is 
insignificant at the 5% level. Model 3 excludes both the growth of domestic credit and 
domestic inflation from the equation and the results show that the rest of the variables are 
significant. The likelihood ratio test with two degree of freedom, for exclusion of the two 
variables are not significant, suggesting that domestic credit and inflation can be 
excluded from model.  
Model 4 shows the results of logit model in which the estimates have been 
divided by 1.81 to make them comparable to probit results. The results generated by 
simple logit are similar to the probit with random effects, in terms of sign and 
significance of variables. All variables are significant at 1% and 5% levels except the 
growth of domestic credit and domestic inflation suggesting that the results are not driven 
by specific method of estimation.  
 
CONCLUSION 
  This study examines the determinants of currency crises in Malaysia, Thailand, 
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data. The empirical findings indicate that reserve inadequacy, deteriorating trade balance, 
increases of bank’s claims on private sector and misalignment of real exchange rate 
increase the probability of a speculative attack. The results also suggest that currency 
crises could be contagious. 
  The growth rate of domestic credit should capture the behaviour of monetary 
policies preceding the crises but the results do not support that lending booms in these 
countries weaken the structure of the banking sector and increase the probability of 
speculative attacks on the domestic currency. In addition domestic inflation is not an 
important macroeconomic variable in determining the probability of currency crisis. The 
result do not supports the notion that inconsistent in macroeconomic policies will lead to 
the countries having in a speculative situation suggesting that monetary expansion to 
finance the fiscal deficit do not increase the probability of currency crisis 
  It could be concluded that in the Asian currency crises, there is a linkage between 
the economic fundamentals and currency crises. The economic fundamentals are the M2 
to international reserve, the trade balance, bank’s claims on private sector and the 
misalignment of real exchange rate as well as the contagion effects. The contagion 
indicator suggests that the currency crises in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the 
Philippines were partly driven by the effect of economic disturbances in neighbouring 
countries.  These results suggest that the central banks should closely monitor the 
changes in these fundamental variables to prevent the occurrence of currency crises. 
Table 1 
                              Macroeconomic Indicators 
 
                                                       Year                    Malaysia                Indonesia               Thailand                 Philippines 
 
1. Real GDP Growth Rate (%): 
                                                       1991                          8.8                          8.9                         8.4                          -0.2      
  15                                                       1992                          7.8                          7.2                         7.8                           0.3   
                                                       1993                          8.4                          7.2                         8.3                           2.1    
                                                       1994                          9.4                          7.5                         8.8                           4.4    
                                                       1995                          9.4                          8.1                         8.6                           4.8                      
                                                       1996                          8.6                          8.0                         6.4                           5.5   
                                                       1997                          8.0                          4.7                         0.5                           5.1 
                                                       1998                         -7.4                      -13.2                      -10.2                          -0.5 
                                                                                                          
2. Current Account Deficits  (% of GDP): 
                                                       1991                      -8.9                          -3.3                        -7.7                          -2.3   
                                                       1992                      -3.8                          -2.0                        -5.7                          -1.9 
                                                       1993                      -4.5                          -1.3                        -5.1                          -5.5  
                                                       1994                      -5.9                          -1.6                        -4.6                          -4.6                      
                                                       1995                      -9.9                          -3.5                        -2.7                          -2.7   
                                                       1996                      -4.9                          -3.4                        -4.7                          -4.7  
                                                       1997                      -4.8                          -3.8                        -4.0                          -4.0   
                                                       1998                     13.7                           4.2                        11.2                           2.3 
                    
3. Real Effective Exchange Rate (1990=100) 
                                                        1991                       96.9                        99.6                        99.0                     103.1   
                                                        1992                     109.7                      100.8                        99.7                     107.1 
                                                        1993                     111.0                      103.8                      101.9                       97.4  
                                                        1994                     107.1                      101.0                        98.3                     111.7                      
                                                        1995                     106.9                      100.5                     101.7                      109.5   
                                                        1996                     112.1                      105.4                     107.6                      116.3  
                                                        1997                       84.8                        62.3                       72.3                        90.8   
                           
 4. External Debts (US$ billion): 
                                                        1991                      16.0                        76.1                       37.6                         30.4   
                                                        1992                      16.4                        84.4                       43.4                         30.6 
                                                        1993                      19.2                        90.3                       50.6                         32.6  
                                                        1994                      22.9                        89.1                       62.1                         34.3                      
                                                        1995                      27.4                        97.6                       67.1                         37.9   
                                                        1996                      28.5                      120.2                       78.5                         39.0  
                                                        1997                      44.9                      137.1                       93.0                         50.6   
                                                        1998                      42.5                      187.1                       86.1                         53.2 
 
5. Inflation Rates (%): 
                                                       1991                       4.0                        9.0                          6.0                           19.0   
                                                       1992                       4.8                        8.3                          3.8                             8.4 
                                                       1993                       3.6                        9.3                          3.6                             7.8  
                                                       1994                       3.7                        8.5                          5.3                             9.4                      
                                                       1995                       3.4                        9.3                          5.0                             7.9   
                                                       1996                       3.5                        6.5                          5.8                             8.4  
                                                       1997                       2.6                      11.6                          5.6                             5.1   
                                                       1998                       5.3                      58.4                          8.1                             9.8  
                       
6. International Reserve (% of import): 
                                                       1991                       34.4                       42.5                        51.4                        29.4   
                                                       1992                       34.3                       44.2                        52.0                        28.3 
                                                       1993                       33.3                       44.2                        50.6                        30.2  
                                                       1994                       35.3                       43.4                        50.5                        30.5                      
                                                       1995                       34.4                       45.4                        49.4                        29.8   
                                                       1996                       33.5                       47.0                        44.0                        29.3 
                                                       1997                       33.9                       47.6                        42.7                        28.7   
                                                       1998                       54.3                       39.5                        42.0                        33.9 
                                               






                                                                             Models 
 
  16     Variables                         (1)                     (2)                        (3)                       (4) 
                                      Estimated            Estimated             Estimated            Estimated 
                                     Coefficients         Coefficients         Coefficients         Coefficients    
 
Log M2/Reserve              0.7151*             0.7105*                0. 6721*             0.6357*                   
                                       (2.0275)
(a)           (2.0372)              (1.9311)              (1.5943)            
                                       (2.9524)
(b)           (2.9446)              (2.7663)              (2.6931) 
                                        
Domestic Inflation         -0.704E-02         0.672E-02                 -                     0.775E-02 
                                       (-2.0751)            (2.0024)                                          (2.0214) 
                                       (-1.8075)            (1.7566)                                          (1.7138) 
 
Trade Balance                -0.376E-04*      -0.374E-03*         -0.377E-04 *      -0.365E-04*                                                                  
                                       (-1.7757)            (-1.7858)              (-1.8060)            (1.5242) 
                                       (-3.2529)            (-3.2765)              (4.6029)             (-3.2973) 
                                     
Real Exchange Rate       -0.692E-03*      0.702E-03*           0.617E-03*         0.678E-03        
                                       (-1.1228)           (1.1516)                (1.0143)               (0.9734) 
                                       (-4.6887)           (4.7829)                (4.6029)               (4.3711)                   
 
Domestic Credit              2.3644                    -                             -                    1.9621 
                                       (0.2558)                                                                     (0.1877) 
                                       (1.9241)                                                                     (0.8641) 
 
Bank’s Claims                0.151E-04*        0.150E-04*          0.156E-04*          0.146E-04*                    
                                       (1.7550)             (1.7666)               (1.8358)               (1.5082) 
                                       (3.5062)             (3.5428)               (3.7919)               (3.2973) 
 
Regional Contagion          3.7022*           3.7028*               3.9369*                3.7243* 
                                        (4.5257)            (4.5772)              (4.8768)               (4.0265) 
                                        (3.9740)            (3.9583)              (4.3861)               (3.3233) 
 
 
Pseudo R-Square               0.3548             0.2718                0.2623                  0.3559 
Likelihood Ratio Test
 (c)        -                   1.0658                4.2829                        - 
                                                                with 1 d.f            with 2 d.f 
 
* significance at 1% level 
(a)  T-ratios to test the significance of initial coefficient 
(b) Marginal  effects 
(c)  Likelihood ratio test for excluded variable(s) 
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